Iran’s nuclear ambitions pose difficulties for Russia
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How Russia should react to Iran’s activity in the nuclear sphere.
Teheran is refusing to conduct negotiations with the “group of six” countries who are international mediators (permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) on the Iranian nuclear problem. This was announced by the official representative of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Golamhossein Elham. The reason for such a defiantly harsh decision was the adoption of another UN Security Council resolution at the beginning of March, presupposing new sanctions against Iran. “Negotiations on the nuclear problem with the ‘group of six’ or some other individual country will no longer be held,” emphasized Golamhossein Elham.
Thus, Russia has found itself in the category of states, with which Iran does not intend to discuss, much less coordinate, questions of development of its nuclear programme. And this is despite the fact that the Russian leadership has in fact always officially spoken out for granting Iran the right to develop its nuclear sector under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] guarantees. All of the Russian Federation ministers of atomic energy - starting with Viktor Mikhaylov and ending with the current head of the Rosatom State Corporation, Sergey Kiriyenko - have repeatedly confirmed that all of Iran’s activity in the nuclear sphere is in precise compliance with the IAEA standards and bears an exclusively peaceful nature.
However, many experts have understood long ago that such assurances contained a significant portion of coyness. The latest statements by the Iranian leadership clearly demonstrate that Iran will never reject uranium enrichment by its own efforts and on its own territory. Back in October of 1991, Ayatollah Mohadsharani, the Vice-President of Iran, announced: “Since our enemy (Israel -Nezavisimaya Gazeta) has nuclear devices at its disposal, the Muslim countries must have the same potential.” It is unlikely that the Arab countries and Iran will ever agree to a nuclear monopoly by Tel-Aviv in this region (Israel’s military potential is estimated at 80-100 nuclear devices).
One gets the impression that, playing on the side of Iran until recently, the Russian leadership was pursuing the goal of “tying” the strategically important southern neighbour to itself. This led to the continuation of construction of the Iranian AES [nuclear power plant] in Bushehr, despite pressure from the United States. This led to the joint statement of Russia and the USA, adopted on the eve of the G8 summit in St Petersburg in 2006, which provided for the creation of international centres for uranium enrichment on Russian territory (obviously, these centres make sense only if Iran agrees to participate in them, but it has synonymously refuted such a prospect). This led to the stubborn desire to develop the sale of modern arms to Iran (at the end of last year, it was learned that Iran would buy five S-300 anti-aircraft missile battalions, with the sum of the deal estimated at around $800 million)…
But ultimately, it turned out that it is not so much Iran that is tied to Russian nuclear technologies, as Russia is tied to the geopolitical strategy of its Islamic neighbour state. And this neighbour certainly does not intend to sacrifice his own interests for the sake of “friendship with the great Russian people.” It is appropriate to recall that, even back in 1997, eight Islamic states, in essence, took the first step towards formation of their own, “Islamic,” NATO. At that time, the creation of a new international organization -the Islamic group of eight -was announced in Ankara. The new interstate formation included Nigeria, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
In the case of Iran, we have, aside from all else, also the struggle for the market in the sale of nuclear technologies. France and the USA are much more tolerant towards such regimes in the “third world,” where they supply nuclear technologies. At the same time, the self-proclaimed development of the nuclear potential of India and Israel, with supervisory control from the USA, has not evoked any international perturbations. But nevertheless, by its policy of non-cooperation and secrecy, Iran is placing Russia in an extremely difficult position. How to combine the strategic and commercial interests of Russia -that is a non-trivial task for the country’s leadership.
Filed by Nicole Cargill under Energy and Nuclear Safety, East-West Relations: Central and Eastern Europe, Arms Control, Proliferation and WMD